The economic zone of Rajin-Seonbong (Raseon) is located at the north-eastern border of North Korea, adjacent to China and Russia. Although its attractiveness to foreign investors has remained limited since its creation in 1991, Raseon is of growing interest as a transit port for Russian and Chinese trade. This paper reviews some theories on the constraints and advantages of remotely located ports, arguing that limited economic base can be overcome by a strategy based on transhipment flows to and from China, South Korea, Russia and Japan. In particular, it develops the idea that economic factors, such as remoteness from the nation"s core region, are not sufficient to explain the uneven success of the project. More likely is the mismatch between local industries and port facilities. Unlike the Chinese free-trade zone experiment, port and logistics development in North Korea may take place prior to industrial development, strengthening Raseon as a potential gateway and growth pole in Northeast Asia.
INTRODUCTION
On the other hand, only a very few studies at the regional and local level show how contrasted the North Korean territory is, although complementary research on the development of Nampo, North Korea"s main port and gateway to Pyongyang, has been recently provided (Jo and Ducruet, 2006) . Still now, the country remains very closed to the outside world and "the lack of a comprehensive data-gathering structure using modern economic concepts and a systematic reporting mechanism make quantitative assessments difficult" (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, 2005) . Thus, it is difficult to get a detailed and recent picture of every main economic centre and province.
In this context, Rajin-Seonbong appears to be the most documented and controversial case of the current North Korean transition towards a market economy. However, "given the lack of detailed information about the internal decision-making process (…) it is difficult to analyze" (Kim, 2001) . Following the Joint-Operation Act of 1984 and the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, the Rajin-Seonbong Free-Trade Zone was established by the central government, directly attracting most of the US$134 million of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country (Park, 2004) . In 2000, the city of Rajin and the county of Seonbong were merged to form the new administrative unit named "Raseon." Although it has not brought sudden openness to the entire North Korean economy (Noland and Flake, 1997) , Raseon is the first capitalist experiment in the country"s history, much inspired from the Chinese experience of Special Economic Zones.
The case of Raseon demands an updated outlook for several reasons. First, the usual argument of geographical remoteness as a constraint to foreign investment seems not to be sufficient, given the worse failure of Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, created in 2002 and based on its good connection to communication networks and its proximity to Chinese markets, for political reasons. Second, the North Korean economy and trade have improved since the reforms of July 2002, notably with its immediate neighbours: China, Russia and South Korea.
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Moreover, Chinese trade with North America is ever-growing and requires more direct access to the Pacific Ocean, to bypass the Yellow Sea ports. But also trade between China, South Korea, Japan, and even Europe (Rajin can be considered as a key nodal point at the end of the Trans-Siberian Railway), give this area a high strategic dimension for the entire region. Given such a perspective, the dispersed opinions must be clarified by looking at how port and industrial development are tied together. The Raseon case might be analysed as a case where political factors affect the simultaneous industrial and port growth depicted elsewhere in general (Takel, 1974) or in the specific context of a developing regional economy (Airriess, 1989) . This is hinted by recent studies on Raseon, explaining its relative failure by political instability despite more favourable tax concessions than its neighbours, including Chinese zones (Nam and Radulescu, 2004) . Furthermore, the argument in favour of a good connection of ports to their national hinterland seems not working for Raseon, which generates port throughputs without being connected by land transport to Pyongyang area, the core market of the country. Then, the limitations that usually cause port activity to decline can be overcome, by allowing Raseon to become one of China"s gateways and, probably, one of Northeast Asia"s main entry points, instead of being North Korea"s gateway. Unlike the Chinese case of Shenzhen, were industries developed before ports thanks to the proximity of the already existing Hong Kong hub, port and logistic improvement in North Korea must happen before industrial development. By doing so, the FTZ project can get the recognition it failed to gain from foreign investors, at a time when factors of uncertainty combined dramatically with technical inadequacies and hampered the project.
In this respect, a number of questions need to be answered by referring to the previous literature on the relationship between ports and development. Since industrial location and central place theories related to North Korea have been discussed elsewhere (Lee, 2001) , this paper proposes an overlook of Raseon through two other sets of theories: the spatial and halshs-00458545, version 1 -21 Feb 2010 functional development model of the "remote nodal gateway" (Stern and Hayuth, 1984) , and a theory on the "lock-in effect" of centralized urban systems (Fujita and Mori, 1996) . The interesting fact concerning Raseon, is its unconnectedness with its national core region, but its growing linkages with an external exporting area, the Chinese province of Jilin (Cotton, 1996a ).
The first section of this paper reviews the theories on the economic development of remote ports. The second section addresses the background of Raseon FTZ in the context of North Korea"s gradual opening to trade and foreign investment. Then, a third section focuses on the potential of Raseon in terms of labour supply, port infrastructure and trade activity with neighbouring countries, together with a specific analysis of cargo vessel movements between 1985 and 2005 at Rajin port. Finally, the last section addresses some policy implications about the possible future of Raseon as a new pole in Northeast Asia.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AT REMOTELY LOCATED PORTS

General characteristics of port nodes
Although it is true that ports, like any other transport infrastructure, may encourage economic development, through agglomeration and scale economies (Bird, 1977) , the growing complexity of transport players" strategies has dramatically questioned the systematic relationship between port activity, local economy and hinterland proximity, due to other factors such as port competition and land-sea accessibility (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005) .
Furthermore, the level of traffic "is, at least in part, a reflection of the quality of the city"s location." It combines the two dimensions of centrality -the hub city"s own traffic-generation power that comes from its size and function as well as its location -and intermediacy -extra activity levels conveyed to the hub by the carrier"s choice of this location for operational geographical emphasis within their transportation systems (Fleming and Hayuth, 1994 Ducruet (2004) in the port-city matrix, gateways and hubs have in common a higher intermediacy (Figure 1 ). Gateways are subdued to remote markets and develop few activities apart from heavy industry and logistics (e.g. Le Havre, Genoa, Rotterdam), while hubs are dominated by transport functions (e.g. Gioia Tauro, Freeport, Salalah), and outports are gateways of close cities (e.g. Bremerhaven / Bremen, Belawan / Medan, Sepetiba / Rio de Janeiro). Those three types have in common a strong intermediacy but a limited centrality.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The distance to core regions Two sets of theories help to balance the simple effect of distance on the developmental effects of ports. First, the geopolitically located port model defined by Stern and Hayuth (1984) as a port isolated and remote from the population and economic centres of its country. Compared to a conventional port system, such a port develops in four stages, based on the cases of Aqaba (Jordan) and Eilat (Israel):
-remote nodal gateway: serving directly and only the national economic core restricts the activity to the port function, without leading to any development effects on the port city and its vicinity, nor to any emergence of a proper hinterland; -functional gateway: market expansion at the economic core and its immediate periphery, but the gateway remains unaffected despite the growth of cargo; halshs-00458545, version 1 -21 Feb 2010 -transit gateway: national strategy of profit-maximisation and diversification of traffics due to the inclusion of in-transit cargo shipments, turning the relationship between the core and the gateway into a two-way linkage; -integrated transhipment system: improvement of transport between core and gateway (e.g., intermodal links), but the latter still suffers from remoteness and the lack of human resources. Only limited intra-urban activity growth is observed, with very few peripheral effects on the gateway"s surroundings.
The details of Rajin-Seonbong indicate that it would correspond to such a case, given its remoteness and its limited urban and industrial growth in the last decades. However, a main difference with the model is the lack of relation between the Pyongyang capital region and Raseon ( Figure 2 ). Rail transport would take two or three days between the two areas, and road transport is almost unthinkable given the poor transport conditions, in a country where 93 percent of roads are unpaved (Bang, 2004) . The mountainous barrier between East and West is only overcome by railways, the dominant transport mode of the country (Oh, 2001) since logistics costs hamper truck voyages (Roussin and Ducruet, 2006) . While remoteness from Pyongyang can be seen as both economically negative and politically positive for the zone (Kim, 2001) , former studies have neglected the role of intermediacy among macroregional factors. Furthermore, distance to bigger ports and trading regions is not a constraint but an advantage in the strategy of developing transhipment or load centre functions, as in the challenge of peripheral ports depicted by Hayuth (1981 (Thorez, 1998) . Such trends can be explained by the need for Baltic port cities to diversify their traffics, to bypass the limitations of inland transport systems and to find external forces that can be an engine to induce local economic development. As a result, most industrial parks in the Baltic States have been created around port areas like Ventspils, Liepaja, Riga, Tallinn and Klaipeda. Fujita and Mori (1996) note that "in many developing countries (such as Indonesia and Thailand), although their governments have striven to decentralize industry to the periphery, the lock-in effect of existing primate cities (which are mostly port cities) has been so strong that their efforts have been unsuccessful." In particular, the authors indicate that the improvement of transport connections between the centre (i.e., Pyongyang) and the periphery (i.e., Raseon) may be harmful to the industrial development of the latter, especially if the remote port city has not developed any specific and competitive industry. Raseon stands far behind other ports in terms of proximity to mines and natural resources, apart from the largest coal field of the country, which occupies almost 50 percent of North Hamgyeong province (Wu, 2004) . Only the worsening of the transport connection might allow the peripheral port to develop thanks to "self-reinforcing agglomeration economies." Pyongyang is not a port but a continental core connected to the sea only by the Daedong River, where navigation is limited to small barges carrying raw bulky products like sand. In this respect, the absence of sufficient linkages between the core and the periphery may help ports, as in such perspective "the halshs-00458545, version 1 -21 Feb 2010 advantages of water-transport (…) shift the larger cities from the centre of the region to points on the periphery" (Smolensky and Ratajczak, 1965) .
ADVANTAGES AND CONSTRAINTS OF RASEON FTZ
Background and economic performance
The Free Economic and Trade Zone of Rajin-Seonbong was planned by the 74 th decision of the Administration Council of North Korea on 28 December, 1991. Because independence and self-suffiency were not inconsistent with foreign trade, the former leader Kim Il-Seong chose Rajin-Seonbong as a first experiment of an open door policy (Cotton, 1996b) .
Motivation from the central government was based on the inefficiency of its own economic strategies and production system, the shortage of foreign currency, the successful experience of China and the sudden isolation provoked by the disruption of trade with the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s (Nam and Radulescu, 2004) . Rajin-Seonbong also appears as a key element of the Tumen River Project from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which aims at enhancing regional cooperation between neighbouring states and provinces.
Covering 746 sq m since its enlargement in 1993, it is one of the planned "growth centres"
with the Russian port of Posyet and the Chinese open city of Hunchen. In this context, "the DPRK is the most avid proponent of [the project] since they are unwilling to cede any of their territory to an internationally managed zone" (Marton et al., 1995) .
It has been reported that among the 113 registered companies in 1998 operating in the zone, 67 remained in 2000 of which 20 were Japanese. The total FDI flows (see Table 1 ) reached an amount of $US 88 million in 1998, accounting for almost 9 percent of the total investment in Table 1 all point at the sudden increase in GDP and trade since 1999. However, this trend is not well reflected by official port statistics in which traffics are rather stagnating along the period.
There is no equivalent evolution of trade volumes and port traffics. Two reasons are proposed:
the landward character of trade, and the little adequacy between port functions and local industries. The dominance of China and of imports shows that instead of using the port as a catalyser, major developments in Raseon are more likely to be oriented towards China itself through road and rail transport. This is hinted by local observers which consider inland container traffic -3,000 boxes in 1997 -with neighboring cities (e.g. Hunchen, Tumen) as crucial (The People"s Korea, 1997b). In addition, China applies preferential treatment:
"products that were processed in the Rajin area with Chinese materials and then imported to China, for instance, were labelled domestic trade and were thus exempted from customs inspection" (Kim, 2006) .
In terms of port capacity, the port of Rajin is ranging from 3 to 3.5 million tons of trade, but its current throughput is said to be less than 10 percent of its capacity (Tumen River Area Development Programme, 2006). Despite a limited activity, Raseon is well equipped on a national level in terms of port infrastructure and capacity. However, the specialisation of Rajin port, based on coals, fertilizers, timber, and sundries is not well matched with a local economy focused on seafood, food processing, construction, real estate, tourism, and transport, since the economic zone has been launched. Available information on Rajin and Seonbong ports much reflect the pre-Raseon period defined by the priority to heavy industries and bulk products, which is reflected in the poor level of cargo handling facilities. Seonbong port is more specialised in petrochemical products and crude oil imports, with 3.2km-long undersea pipelines connected to Seungri Chemical Co., Seonbong Thermal Power Plant and a floating oil dock (Asia Trade Hub, 2006 ). Seonbong"s economy is also much linked to energy,
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with uranium mine and a 200-megawatt oil-fired power plant, an oil refinery and an electric power plant. In fact, transit trade has been dominant at Raseon ports since the 1960s, handling
Russian cargoes from Vladivostok and Nakhodka to Japan and Southeast Asia, such as fertilizers, marine products, and redirecting steel pipes, general cargoes and raw aluminium materials from Japan, Australia to Russia (Han, 2006) . This may explain why the local economy has little to do with traditional port activities. Conversely, most recent investments show the weak linkages between local industries and the port (Table 2) , as already stated by UN official Ian Davies, head of the Tumen project: "we would have liked to have seen more contracts signed in the manufacturing sector" (Lee, 1996) . This is confirmed by Kim (2006) that "the sectors in which China invested have heretofore focused on service" although more attention has been recently drawn upon manufacturing, mining, and energy. Among the industries in Raseon that may use the port for exporting their products, most are concerned with small cargo volumes (e.g. fish and marine products), while other industries are mostly services and retail.
[INSERT When comparing the two profiles of Rajin and Seonbong according to housing capacity, it appears that the status of Rajin as a city is reflected in the higher proportion of high density housing, and the number of rural-type units are higher for Seonbong. Thus, the urban centre of Raseon is Rajin itself. Furthermore, the settlement pattern of the two city-regions shows that Rajin, with 95 percent of housing units in the core area, is much more compact than Seonbong, which has only 77 percent. It is partly an effect of the site, because Rajin is much more constrained than Seonbong.
Thus, the potential sites for the expansion of port and industrial facilities are scarce in Rajin and quite important in Seonbong (Figure 3 ), as indicated in Table 3 . The advantage however is that the most important sites for industrial development are located on both sides of the tunnel, close to the satellite neighbourhood of Unjakgu (Rajin) and the district of Namgwandong (Seonbong), what can facilitate the communication and interaction between the two locations. Then, the tunnel itself should be maintained and secured for regular truck transport.
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In addition, Raseon"s share of population among other North Korean port cities is relatively low, due to the very limited natural growth and strong institutional control of in-migrations ( Figure 4) . Population figures are difficult to interpret in North Korea due to the very controlled dimension of migration and transportation, and to the recent famines that lowered population considerably, especially in areas remote from Pyongyang. As it is a border area and a port, Raseon is highly strategic and the North Korean government and the army might have reduced to a minimum the working population in the area, and constrained the "natural" effect of the gateway"s self-agglomeration (e.g. rural exodus). On a national scale, the closest halshs-00458545, version 1 -21 Feb 2010
cities to Pyongyang, namely Nampo and Songrim, which are also ports, enjoyed the highest demographic growth, and closely followed by the port city of Haeju and the city of Sariwon.
Away from the capital region, only the city of Sinuiju and the port city of Cheongjin show important growth during that period. Rajin remains a small coastal town where the FTZ project and the port activity still haven"t been able to enhance the city size and functions, or act as a growth pole.
[ provinces, and 80% of North Korea"s exports pass through Sinuiju at the border with China (Tsuji, 2005) . In fact, freight transport activity in North Korea is concentrated in the major port regions of the country: the Nampo-Pyongyang corridor (South Pyeongan) and the Raseon-Cheongjin area (North Hamgyeong).
As a result, Raseon is North Korea"s most dependent area on port activity and maritime trade, according to the relative concentration index used by Ducruet and Lee (2006) under "1"), and Raseon is comparatively an unusual case, with the enormous importance of port functions compared to other functions.
A synthesis of pros and cons
In both comparison tables of Kim (2000) and Lee (2001) about the characteristics of possible investment areas in North Korea, Raseon is ranked seventh among eight. Transportation, agglomeration effect and labour quantity were described as the limiting factors while raw material provision is the only factor exceeding average scores. Again, explanations are funded on deterministic factors such as remoteness and altitude. 
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The modal distribution of trade volumes to and from Raseon or North Hamgyeong province is not known. Little information exists about the main sea routes linked to Rajin port but detailed traffic statistics remains very scarce. Since 1995, it was reported that a shipping line was moving Chinese containerised cargo abroad through Rajin, as well as some fertiliser brought by rail from Russia, using a multipurpose terminal. Chinese interests are also reflected in the leasing of Rajin"s second pier to China for 80 years (Ming, 2003) . But still, the regular shipping route established in 1999 with the Japanese port of Akita is "dormant [and has] only irregular services, mainly due to a lack of cargo" (Tsuji, 2003 [
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Cargo vessel traffics in Northeast Asia
Although they do not perfectly illustrate the real amount of tons handled at Rajin port, data on cargo vessels provided by Lloyd"s, a leading maritime insurance company registering approximately 80% of the world"s fleet, allow a good overview of the different trends affecting the gateway (Table 6 ). Ship capacities in deadweight tons (DWT) have been summed on a yearly basis and distributed according to the type, volume, origin and destination of the cargoes.
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At first glance, Rajin has never been a leading port in North Korea. Its relative capacity on a national scale has only exceeded 7% during the three years following the operation of RajinSeonbong FTZ (1992 . settled there, like in other developing countries. However, due to this mismatch between service activities (e.g. hotels, casino, and telecommunications) and the port, the latter has not been able to act as an engine for industrial development. Its role has remained limited to secondary activities such as seafood exports.
Political factors concern the relationship between investors and North Korean officials.
Investors would not have been suddenly discouraged after a few years of operation since basic requirements were provided. In fact, the sudden disrupts since 1994 shows that urgent political and first aid matters have taken precedence over the capitalist experiment. It has become rapidly more difficult to restart the project on growingly unstable grounds and ageing infrastructures. It definitely depreciates the deterministic argument on the low economic profitability due to accessibility and connectedness. Moreover, ten years after the creation of the Rajin-Seonbong FTZ, the demise of Sinuiju SAR proved that the remoteness of Raseon was not the main factor limiting its development. Although Raseon hasn"t emerged yet as an industrial growth pole, its port activity has been steady despite the absence of a hinterland and halshs-00458545, version 1 -21 Feb 2010 a local economic base. At the end, Raseon"s role is better described as a connecting point between regional economies, rather than a gateway for its own province and country.
Regarding Stern and Hayuth"s model of the remote gateway, Raseon surely matches with the developmental stages described: limited effects of port activity on the local and regional economy, and growth of transit trade to serve outlying regions rather than its own hinterland, which is absent or limited to one type of material (coal). However, the model does not match the case of Raseon entirely because the main region served is not the core region of the country. Then, Raseon is not the gateway of North Korea (or Pyongyang) but the gateway of Far-East regions, competing with Russian ports to serve East Sea and Pacific trade. Such a situation can be compared to some Baltic ports like Tallinn, Riga and Klaipeda, whose activity is mostly coming from Russian transit trade to and from Western Europe, due to inland freight constraints and a limited national market in a context of transition (Brodin, 2003) .
Regarding Fujita and Mori"s theory of the lock-in effect of urban systems on port cities, it appears that the distance to Pyongyang and the very limited connectedness between Pyongyang and Raseon did not produce self-agglomeration effects in terms of demographic and economic growth. Here, political factors are crucial and have constrained the development of the FTZ, despite the efforts to implement a capitalist enclave at a time when even economic reforms were still unthinkable. Thus, the continuous growth of Raseon"s port and logistic function seems to be the only way to make this place attractive to foreign investment, and the vision of Raseon as a growth pole resulting from FTZ incentives should be left aside in a first stage.
Looking back in time, the FTZ project should have been less ambitious and focused on pure logistics instead of aiming at creating a favourable business environment without much evidence of the place"s ability to trade. One should notice that up to 1998, hotel business and halshs-00458545, version 1 -21 Feb 2010 tourism occupied 35% of Raseon"s FDI, but the casino has since been deserted by its Chinese customers. By basing its development on the port function, Raseon could follow the "traditional" port city evolution, with a gradually diversification of its economy, from a port city to an industrial city and to a general city (Murphey, 1989 General trade  ------------452  641  826  Processing on  commission trade  ------------55  57  73   Border trade  --304  ---210  130  100  130  369  352  196  300  441   Bonded area trade  ------------299  342  180   Aid  ------------11  15  38 Others 
